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HOUSING MARKET OPERATIONS AND THE
PENNSYLVANIA RENT WITHHOLDING
ACT - AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

A Review of National Housing Production 1950-1970

Almost daily in our major cities' newspapers one reads reports
on the deteriorating quality of urban neighborhoods and housing
throughout the cities and older suburban areas. Large scale housing
abandonment, "rent strikes," rat control projects, and lead paint removal projects have all become modern signs of the nation's housing ills.
Ever since President Franklin Roosevelt's "One-third of a Nation"
speech in 1933,' the federal government has attempted to deal effectively
with the nation's housing ills.2 While there have been some considerable results, much of the nation's population is still ill-housed. In
recent years, specifically since 1949, and increasingly during the 1960's,
there have been great increases in federal housing programs and
expenditures. From 1950 to 1970 an estimated 30 million housing
units were built in the United States with 10.1 million substandard
units eliminated, thus expanding the net supply of standard housing
units by 80.7 per cent (contrasted to a 35 per cent rise in population),
an enviable accomplishment for any nation.
Yet, throughout this period substantial variations in the performance of the national housing markets occurred. In the post-war 1940's
and early 1950's, average new residential construction starts increased significantly,4 no doubt to some degree reflecting the low
construction rates in the Depression and World War II years. However, the boom in residential construction in the 1 9 50's was also a
result of public policy measures of low interest rates, down payment
requirements and available mortgage insurance which combined to
meet the high latent demand for new housing. Residential construction
expenditures in the 1950's, as a percentage of the gross national product, never dropped below 4.5 per cent and peaked in 1955 at 5.8 per
1. H. WOLMAN, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOUSING 28 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as H. WOLMAN].
2. For an excellent history and review of national and local housing policy, see

L.

FRIEDMAN,

(1968)
3.
141, 143
4.
forward

GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING -

A

CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION

[hereinafter cited as L. FRIEDMAN].
Downs, Moving Toward Realistic Housing Goals, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION
(K. Gordon ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Downs].
Comparisons of housing starts per year with 1945-1959 data and 1959data are difficult. In 1959 the Bureau of the Census changed its method

of reporting housing start statistics with the new method being far more inclusive

than the old.
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cent.' Housing starts per thousand existing units in the 1950's
averaged 7.8 per cent.' Throughout the early and middle 1950's,
therefore, the national outlook was one of a substantial national economic commitment toward reaching the nation's housing goals of
"a decent home and a suitable living environment for all Americans."'
The years of the late 1950's and 1960's, however, presented a
somewhat different picture. In the early 1960's national residential
construction rates took a major downturn. In 1960 new construction
starts were only approximately 1.3 million units. Furthermore, after
an impressive year in 1963 (1.65 million starts), new residential construction rates peaked and leveled off to the 1.5 million range in 1964
and 1965.8 The "credit crunch" of 1966 greatly depressed residential
construction with starts dropping to 1.2 million units.9 From 1967 to
1969 residential starts slowly approached and finally reached 1963
levels as national attention again began to focus sharply on national
housing problems. A significant resource allocation away from housing
had taken place during the 1960's, and residential construction expenditures as a percentage of the Gross National Product never rose
higher than 4.8 per cent and dropped to a low of 3.2 per cent in 1967.10
The demand of housing on the dollar as a percentage of all national
expenditures also decreased in the 1960's, with residential starts per
thousand existing units dropping to 7.5 per cent in this period. 1
Moreover, construction costs throughout the 1950-1970 period
had greatly increased -

by 110 per cent -

and at a greater rate

2
than the consumer price index which correspondingly rose 66 per cent.'
While material and labor costs for residential construction increased
greatly, the production factor of residential construction most responsible for this inflation in costs was the price of residential land.
Nationally, from 1950 to 1966, while the average costs of a new
house and its site increased from $8,954 to $17,984, the cost of the
site itself increased from $1,035 to $3,627 - more than twice as fast

as total costs. 13 Furthermore, the site as a percentage of final costs

of a new house increased from 12 per cent to 20.2 per cent.' 4 Recent
5. M.
SIXTIES

SCHussHEIm, TOWARD A

63 (1969)

NEW

[hereinafter cited as M.

HOUSING POLICY SCHUSSHEIM].

THE LEGACY OF THE

6. Id. at 19-21.
7. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, 414, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1441, 1450 (1970).
8. M.

SCHUSSHEIM,

supra note 5, at 20.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 19, 63.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 32. Figures are for the period from 1946-1966.

13. Id. at 40.
14. Id.
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years have seen a continuation of this trend which further increases

the purchase price of newly constructed units.15
Increasing civil unrest in the cities, as well as the dismal production and inflation levels in the housing industry, led the Johnson
administration in 1966 and 1967 to reexamine national housing policy
and the plight of American cities. Reporting in 1968, the Kaiser and
Douglas Commissions'" each published extensive reports of factors
involved in the supply and demand for housing. Of the recommendations of these study groups, one in particular bears special attention
for the purpose of this discussion. The Kaiser Committee on Urban
Housing recommended the construction of 26.7 million new residential
units by 1978.17

This projection of national housing need in the next decade represented a goal almost equal to the previous twenty years' production
record. One commentator, Mr. Anthony Downs, estimated the real
need at a somewhat higher 27.7 million units.' Either goal would,
of course, represent a substantial redirection of national resources
toward housing. Congress, in the Housing Act of 1968,'" accepted the
26.7 million unit figure as the national policy for the 1970's.
To achieve this goal will be difficult. Residential construction
at these levels would require a similar massive investment, with increases in housing manpower and financing, and in other kinds of
related residential services, such as highways, parks, public transit,
schools, and infrastructure,20 to name a few.
By the year 2000 an estimated 45 to 80 million additional Americans will have to be housed with an estimated 80 per cent of all
population growth in the United States from 1960-1985 occurring in
the suburban ring. 2 ' Mr. Downs has determined that 17.9 million
units of his estimated 27.7 million units will have to be constructed
15. For a survey of median costs for new construction housing in the Delaware
Valley region, see DELAWARE VALLEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, Nos. 4 & 5

(1971).

This continuing problem of escalating costs of new construction was the
subject of much recent concern in Montgomery County. See D. LONGMAID & R.
BINGHAM, HOUSING IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 12 (1968).
16. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,
273-75 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY]. See generally
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME (1968) [hereinafter
cited as A DECENT HOME].
17. A DECENT HOME, supra note 16, at 39-40.
18. Downs, supra note 3, at 142.
19. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
476, as amended.
20. The term "infrastructure" as used here includes a wide scope of necessary
public facilities such as water, health, police, fire, and sewage treatment services.
21. Downs, supra note 3, at 144; Hauser & Hodge, The Challenge of America's
Metropolitan Population Outlook 1960-1985, in NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 3 (1968).
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in the suburbs.22 Even if one believes that the need projections of
Downs and the Kaiser Committee are unrealistic, high levels of residential construction, around two million per year in the 1970's, would
seem necessary to maintain adequate housing and social policy. Despite recent record residential construction starts, it is questionable
whether such levels can be long maintained.
The foregoing historical overview of national housing production
has been presented for several reasons. First, it is essential to recognize
the relationships between the realization of national housing goals and
the housing conditions of all American citizens. In order to replace
substandard units in the housing stock, it is necessary that rates of
residential construction remain substantially above national rates of net
household formation. That is, unless we produce housing at a rate at
least equal to the growth in households, the growth in demand for hous.
ing will exceed the growth in supply, creating housing shortages and
"bidding up" rents and sales prices. For the market to operate properly
and to replace the supply of substandard and overcrowded housing,
residential construction must proceed at high rates, substantially higher
in the next decade than in the past. Without such rates of construction,
it is submitted that no metropolitan area or large city will likely see
substantial improvement in its housing conditions.
Second, to develop sensitive housing policies on a local or regional
level, it is essential to appreciate the relation of national or regional
housing construction rates to fluctuations in the national economy
and in the mortgage market. As interest rates rise (perhaps to control
inflation), housing construction usually decreases. Further, as the
economy heats up, alternate investment possibilities often make investment in residential mortgages less attractive.
Third, increases in the costs of new construction, particularly in
the land component, appear to have reduced significantly that portion
of the American public capable of purchasing new construction. 23 As
has been explained and will be discussed in more detail later, any
decrease in the rates of new construction will prevent any real improvement in national housing conditions. Average new construction
prices have been rising quickly over the past several years, further limiting the market for new construction. Recent federal subsidy programs, 24
which attempt to increase the market for new construction, and new
22. Downs, supra note 3, at 146.
23. The price paid for land by a housing developer as well as the intensity of
its developed use (units per acre) is a principal determinant of the value or rent
of units to be built. If land prices are high and zoning restrictions severely limit
density, the developer can build only high price units to recoup his substantial land

investment.

24. For descriptions of the purpose and coverage of federal housing subsidy
programs, see M. ScHussHEIM, supra note 5, at 1-25.
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development techniques such as cluster developments and planned unit
developments, 25 which attempt to decrease the sales price of new
construction by more efficient land use and construction flexibility,
are exemplary of actions taken to reverse this trend. Nevertheless,
rising new construction prices will likely remain a serious problem and
threaten the ability of the nation to achieve its housing goals.
Local development controls, zoning, subdivision controls and building codes, insofar as they act to unreasonably increase land costs or
construction costs, are also serious threats to the relieving of national,
regional and local housing problems. Recent interest by planners,
lawyers and the general public has resulted in a serious debate on the
merits of such unlimited forms of local development controls.2" While
recent court decisions on exclusionary zoning have removed some of
the more obvious extremes of land control,2 7 the essential problems
involved are far from settled and will no doubt continue to be argued.
Finally, the solution to housing problems, however perceived,
and whether on a federal, state, or local level, contains certain spatial
and economic characteristics which require levels of organization and
control essential to the development of successful policy. In considering housing problems, therefore, one is required to contend with
a wide variety of related issues, the importance of which can sometimes be viewed only in retrospect. It is only in recent years that
economists have systematically attempted to describe the operation of
housing markets."
It is therefore not surprising that huge gaps
exist in our knowledge of housing problems. The following discussion
will be an attempt, through the use of concepts which are in a relatively
formulative stage, to apply certain concepts of housing market operations to the analysis of a specific housing policy. It is hoped the
reader will appreciate the limitations inherent in this approach.
25. For an excellent discussion of the legal and financial benefits and drawbacks
of planned unit development, see Krasnowicki, Planned Unit Development: A
Challenge to Established Theory and Practiceof Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
47 (1965) ; Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 3 (1965).
26. See, e.g., Davidoff & Gold, Suburban Action: Advocate Planning for an
Open Society, 36 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 12 (1970); Washburn, Apartments in the
Suburbs, 74 DICK. L. REV. 634 (1970) ; Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971).
27. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes v. City of Lackawana, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970) ; Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) ; Cheney
v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968). See also Comment,
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar
to Girsh - A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REV. 507 (1971).
28. The major and most comprehensive existing works in housing policy and
urban economics are W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963)
[hereinafter cited as W. GRIGSBY]; R. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING - THE SPATIAL
PATTERN OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL LAND USE (1969) [hereinafter cited as R. MUTHt];
W. SMITH, HOUSING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ELEM-ENTS

(1971).
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Again, the importance of maintaining a proper perspective in
analyzing housing policies must be stressed. Major improvements in
housing conditions for Americans (and particularly the poor) can be
achieved in the present system only through the effective operation
of housing markets. State or local policies designed to improve housing
conditions must therefore reflect the realities of the market and mesh
with national housing policies, mortgage market conditions, and
economic growth if real improvement is to result.
B.

Housing Codes as Housing Policy

This Article is concerned essentially with the Pennsylvania Rent
Withholding Act.2 9 However, since this Act can be best characterized
as a housing code enforcement tool, it is proper to consider some of
the basic policy principles inherent in housing code programs.
The great growth of interest in housing standards and codes,
while following long established historical and legal trends, no doubt
reflects the urgency of the problem of urban decay. Furthermore, the
slowness and actual failure of past attempts in clearance, redevelopment, and relocation to make major improvements has helped to
promote housing code strategies - strategies designed to require
existing deteriorated housing to be brought up to specific minimum
standards as an alternative to demolishing and replacing such housing
and to prevent housing that has not yet begun to deteriorate seriously
30
from becoming slum property.
Housing codes have thus traditionally dealt with the "deterioration
process" and, by extension, the habitability of the nation's or area's
residential structures. They have emphasized remedial efforts on a
local level to preserve the locality's good housing, while attempting
to maintain minimum standards in the worst areas.
Space does not permit a full history of the development of
housing codes. Several excellent histories already exist. 31 However,
some recent developments, insofar as they are pertinent, bear mention.
Federal interest in housing codes first appeared in the Housing Act
of 1954,32 where codes became part of the "workable program" re29.

PA. STAT.

tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971).

30. As a theoretical example, see Boggan, Housing Codes as a Means of Preventing Urban Blight: ConstitutionalProblems, 16 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 255
(1970).
31. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2; Mood, The Development, Objective
and Adequacy of Current Housing Code Standards, in NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, HOUSING CODE STANDARDS, THREE CRITICAL STUDIES 1 (1969) ; Comment,
Housing Codes and the Prevention of Urban Blight - Administrative and Enforcement Problems and Proposals, 17 VILL. L. REV. 490 (1972).
32. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590, 622, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1450
(1970).
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quirement localities had to submit, prior to federal approval for any
urban renewal funds. The addition of housing codes and "workable
program" requirements were intended to broaden the attack on "blight"
by adding the concept of conservation of existing housing stock to
the clearance or "bulldozer approach" of the Housing Act of 1949."
The "workable program" requirement forced localities to submit
a code enforcement program designed to foster the repair and voluntary
rehabilitation of areas and residences. 4 As the urban renewal program
continued to tear down huge quantities of housing, particularly the
housing of the poor, and the long delays from project planning to
completion left large land parcels cleared and vacant, many began to
question the ability of these slow-moving renewal programs to solve
"urban blight. ' '3 Increasing interest in rehabilitation as a tool to
save the cities developed. Such programs as the Neighborhood Renewal Program of 19563' and the Community Renewal Program of
195931 stressed the conservation and rehabilitation of entire areas, with
housing codes playing a major role.
However, local housing code programs were generally ineffective
in dealing with "blight.13 8 In 1964 and 1965, the federal government
decided to become more directly involved, hoping federal money could
make conservation and rehabilitation work. The Housing Act of
1965 for the first time established federal assistance for code programs
on a two-thirds federal, one-third local basis for planning and municipal service improvement costs. 9 The program hoped to make quick
and visible results over a three to five year period in the housing
quality of large, deteriorating, but still standard,4" urban neighborhoods.
33. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, 414, as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1441, 1450 (1970).
34. Slavet & Levin, New Approaches to Housing Code Administration, in
NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 17, at 156-57 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Slavet & Levin].
35. There are several excellent analyses of the urban renewal programs. See, e.g.,
M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER - A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL
(1964) ; J. BELLUSH & M. HAUSKNECHT, URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND
PLANNING (1967);
TROVERSY (1966).

J. WILSON,

URBAN

RENEWAL:

THE

RECORD AND

THE CON-

36. Housing Act of 1956, ch. 1029, 70 Stat. 1099, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1452
(1970). The purpose of the Neighborhood Renewal Plan was to increase the
overall planning emphasis of urban renewal legislation. The Neighborhood Renewal
Plan was viewed as a more flexible tool involving not only clearance but also
rehabilitation. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 163.
37. Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 672, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1453 (1970).
38. Code Requirements in "Workable Program" Revised, Toughened, 24 J.
HOUSING

37 (1967).

39. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat.
451, 42 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970). See also Slavet & Levin, supra note 34, at 30-32.
40. The term "standard" as used here and applied to individual housing units
or neighborhoods can be defined as any housing unit or housing units in an area
not substandard. Substandard housing is generally defined as all dilapidated housing,
plus all sound or deteriorating housing with inadequate plumbing facilities. Sound,
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The historical development of housing codes has been uneven.
Since the Housing Act of 1949 and its amended versions, however,
particularly section 117 of the Act of 1965,41 the importance of housing
codes as a tool in housing policy has increased. This revitalized interest has caused a considerable debate on the value of codes, their
administration and enforcement, and their ability to make substantive
improvements.
As an application of the police power of the state effectuated
through a local ordinance, housing codes are designed to prescribe the
minimum conditions under which a building may be lawfully used
and occupied as a housing unit. To a large degree, however, housing
code standards have been often ambiguous, seldom quantitative, and
almost never effective in attaining their goal of minimum housing
standards throughout a jurisdiction. The main purpose of housing
codes has been to fight physical deterioration under the theory that
"blight" is a source of economic and social injury to the community,
or as a leading commentator describes it, "a social cost approach" to
housing codes.4" The setting of code standards, however, has often
worked against this purpose. Code standards set high enough to
deal effectively with deterioration in early stages are often too high
to be effective, causing unreasonably high costs of compliance in slum
areas. Furthermore, standards high enough to prevent deterioration
might be nullified through public disregard or judicial action.4" Conversely, if standards, as has often been the case, are set too low, they
are ineffective in reaching their objective of preventing deterioration
and promoting an adequate minimum of conditions necessary for living.
Thus, housing code standards have been beset by two major
problems: (1) the difficulty in relating objective and definite standards
to violations and the lack of data on the real requirements of residential
structures; and (2) the difficulty in establishing a level of standards
sufficiently high to prevent massive residential deterioration, yet not
so high as to place undue repair burdens on owners.
deteriorating, and dilapidated are classifications used by the 1960 Census of Housing
to rate housing conditions. H. WOLMAN, supra note 1, at 20 n.ll.
41. The objectives of the section 117 program were to restore and rehabilitate
sound neighborhoods and to prevent blight by effective code enforcement programs
and improvements in public facilities without the use of extensive clearance or
relocation. Funds were available for the planning and execution of a code enforcement
program, municipal service improvements, technical assistance, and grants and loans
to eligible residents for rehabilitation in the selected areas. Funds were on a
two-thirds federal, one-third local, matching basis.
42. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 51.
43. High standards, sufficient to produce effective results, may be difficult to
justify as minimum standards and could be viewed by the courts as an arbitrary and
capricious use of the police power or confiscatory, constituting a taking of property
without just compensation in violation of due process. For an excellent discussion
of these issues, see Comment, supra note 31, at 495-500.
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The deterioration process is a complicated phenomenon involving
many social as well as economic factors. In many ways, the process
is tied up in values and goals explicitly expressed by the society as a
whole. In general, the deterioration process (which is natural over
time) is accelerated by a major economic or racial change in an
area and is characterized by the following events. Financial institutions,
predicting a decline in the area's market value, hesitate to invest.
Purchasers are driven off, while present owners are unable to finance
improvements. As the process continues, owners, fearing a further
decline in value, either sell or do not maintain normal upkeep. The
process quickens and deterioration changes the basic character of the
neighborhood. It is a downward spiral."

Housing codes, in theory, are capable of dealing with and halting
the deterioration process. By prescribing minimum levels of maintenance, they are assumed to interdict the market downturn and produce
results. That they do not succeed in most cases in halting deterioration
is not surprising. This discussion will illustrate that, except under
the most advantageous conditions, the operation of housing markets

will often doom code programs designed to improve housing conditions
on a wide scale.
It is useful to view the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act
within the general framework of housing code development. As a
code enforcement tool, the Act contains powerful sanctions to accomplish code compliance. 5
In this Article the potential economic effects of the Act on housing
markets and, more specifically, the ability of the Act to achieve certain
policy goals and objectives will be analyzed. Several special features
of the Act, in terms of its general use, bear mention. The Act appears
designed to operate primarily upon the low income rental housing
market. As such, it directly confronts the slumlord as a means to
force code compliance. The literature on housing problems and poverty
has always viewed the slumlord as a wretched and unsavory individual
making exorbitant profits by overcharging the poor for inferior quality
housing. Only recently has this stereotype been examined in any detail.
While evidence is currently inconclusive, it appears certain that many of
the characteristics of the onerous slumlord of the past are not true.46 No
44. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801
(1965).
45. See. e.g., Depaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971). See
Comment, The Pennsylvania Project - A Practical Analysis of the Pennsylvania
Rent Withholding Act, 17 VILL. L. REV. 821, 834-35 & nn.53-58 (1972).
46. For examples of the classic view on slumlords, see L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 2, at 39-44; J. Riis, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1957). For a contrary view,
see Kahn, Note: Speaking Out: We Need More Slumlords, in A.
LEACH, CASES & TEXT ON PROPERTY 508-12 (2d ed. 1969).
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doubt, within the low income housing market there exists slumlords
that fit these classic definitions. However, George Sternlieb in his
study of Newark, and other researchers in other cities, have found
a much more diverse pattern of landlords in low income areas.47
Suffice it to say at this juncture, that patterns of ownership in slum
property are much more diffuse than previously thought. Furthermore,
slum ownership has and must still be considered a real estate investment of high risk. Financing for purchase or rehabilitation of slum
property is most expensive (when available) and generally of a short
term nature. Vacancy rates are often high and the general weakness of
the market aggravates the investment risks. Tenants are often destructive and are unwilling or unable to pay higher rents for improved
conditions. High property taxes present large fixed operating expenses
which constitute a great burden on the small owner. These factors,
taken together, present a far more realistic view of slumlords.
It is imperative that housing policies designed to deal with low
income housing markets recognize the problems and diversity of slum
ownership. If housing policy is not sensitive to these issues, counterproductive results will likely occur. To properly analyze the economic
effects of the rent withholding law on housing markets, a basic description of the operations of these markets, as well as some of the
distinctive features resulting from these operations, is necessary.

II.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HOUSING MARKETS

A.

The Housing Services Package

A thorough economic analysis of the urban housing market would
require a much longer exposition than will be attempted here. Nonetheless, because some concepts are essential to an understanding of the
impact of code enforcement and rent withholding upon this market,
a few very basic factors will be considered.
The housing market appears almost to defy economic analysis
because it violates practically every assumption fundamental to microeconomic models. Consider the theoretical simplicity of the market
for a low-cost consumer commodity readily available in any produce
market - for example, oranges. Though the example may seem
capricious, it serves to point out fundamental differences between
housing and other consumer goods. In the case of oranges, the commodity is a discrete phenomenon, i.e., it comes in small commodity
units. A consumer may, therefore, exactly match the amount of
47. W.
(preliminary
STERNLIEB,

L. ROSENBERG, M. STEGMAN & J. TAYLOR, HOUSING AND POVERTY
draft 1971); G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD (1966); G.
THE URBAN HOUSING DILEMMA (preliminary draft 1970).
GRIGSBY,
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oranges he desires to consume with the number of oranges he can buy.
Because oranges are relatively inexpensive, the most avid orange consumer can purchase as many oranges as he can eat without major decrements of his income. He may buy many oranges, and buy them often,
easily changing from one orange seller to another in response to price
variation. Likewise, oranges have no investment aspects; they are
purchased to be consumed within a relatively short time. Finally, the
benefits or ill-effects of orange consumption accrue only to the individual
consumer. There are, therefore, no economic externalities associated
with orange consumption which have positive or negative effects upon
society at large.
For all these reasons, it makes fairly good sense to conceptualize
the market for oranges and similar consumer commodities as the
simple intersection of supply and demand functions. It is a market
in which a stable equilibrium price can be established through a rapid
iterative bidding mechanism. This is simply not the case with housing.
The unit of housing consumption is neither discrete nor inexpensive.
Likewise, the product is extremely variable over space, and often
variable within a single block, or even a single structure. Further,
consumption of the commodity is not easily definable, and such consumption as does occur characteristically exerts external costs upon
neighboring tenants and structures.
Many of these features of the housing market become clear
upon consideration of what housing is as a commodity. The basic
unit of housing is the individual residence which, as a commodity in
exchange, is characterized by at least four components."8 One component is the physical quality of the dwelling unit - its structural
soundness, attractiveness, comfort and convenience. The state of repair
of paint, plaster, stairs, and hallways, and the essential systems heating, plumbing, and electrical - are primary features of the physical
component. In addition, the quality of equipment, the general layout
of rooms, their size and quantity, as well as the amount of storage
space, are elements of the physical quality of the unit.
Another component of the housing unit is the neighborhood or
environmental setting of the unit. The total environmental setting is
composed of two factors: the physical and the sociological environments. The physical environment includes such features as the state
48. The components of housing as a commodity or service package have been
discussed at length by many authors. Some discussions have been of a general
nature. See, e.g., C. RAPKIN, L. WINNICK, & D. BLANK, HOUSING MARKET
ANALYSIS A STUDY OF THEORY AND METHODS 7-8 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
C. RAPKIN]. Other commentators have attempted to determine the relationship of rent
to these components. See Kain & Quigley, Measuring the Value of Housing Quality,
J. AM. STATISTICAL Ass'N 532-48 (1970).
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of repair of neighboring units, their design, age, and attractiveness.
Likewise, the general cleanliness of the neighborhood, noise levels,
traffic congestion, and the existence of amenities - light, trees, open
space, and clean air - or the lack thereof are features of the physical
environment. The sociological environment includes such features as
the age, income, racial, and ethnic mix of neighborhood residents and
their attendant values and life styles. The incidence of crime, drug
abuse, and other antisocial activities are also features of the sociological
environment.
A third component of the housing unit as a commodity is the
quality and quantity of social services which residents of an area enjoy.
The extent of fire and police protection, the quality of schools, public
health facilities, and public utilities largely define the social service
component. The quality of many social services, primarily those of a
physical nature such as sewage disposal facilities and water utilities,
are determined by the tax base and policies of a political subdivision.
Others, such as education and police services, may vary over neighborhoods within political subdivisions as a function of sociological features
of the neighborhood environment described above.
The final component primarily includes locational aspects, i.e.,
the accessibility of the unit or its distance in time, money, or convenience from facilities to which residents desire to travel. The
accessibility component is to a great extent a function of the quality,
quantity, and mix of transportation facilities within the neighborhood,
including not only highway and mass transit facilities, but complementary facilities such as parking garages. Accessibility, however,
should not be thought of solely in terms of mechanical transport, for
the walking distance of the unit from convenience and community
services is clearly a partial determinant of the unit's accessibility.
B.

Some Concepts of Housing Market Operations

The components presented suggest that the dwelling unit is a
package commodity consisting of various features which consumers
weigh in their decision to buy or rent. The trade-offs consumers are
willing to make between the components of the housing package
determine who gets what housing, where, and at what cost. The key
concept here is that housing, unlike the micro-economic model of the

oranges given earlier, is not a uniform commodity; rather, it is a
commodity which may vary in all its features from place to place and
house to house. It is, therefore, entirely inadequate to view the sum
of housing units within a metropolitan area as a single stock of homogeneous units and thus a single undifferentiated market. The sum of
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units, rather, consists of separate but interrelated sub-sets, which are
segregated into sub-markets through price competition among consumers.
Housing sub-markets may be defined as the set of units which
at a given price level are viewed by a set of consumers as economically
feasible and equally attractive accommodations.49 The number of consumers so viewing a given set of units constitutes in sum the demand
for the housing sub-set. As casual observation and theoretical considerations suggest, sets of consumers do differentiate themselves to
form sub-markets largely on the basis of income levels. Moreover,
sub-market variance may also result from differential consumption
patterns among persons of varying ages, educations, or ethnic backgrounds. For our immediate purposes, however, such differences can
be ignored.
Nonetheless, the supply element of the housing sub-market consists of those units which consumers at given price levels consider to
be equally attractive where there exists conformity of choice among
consumers of similar income levels. 50 The fact that they find units
equally attractive suggests indifference among consumers relative to
a set of housing units, i.e., that housing sub-markets are characterized
by substitutability among units in terms of consumer utility. However,
to say that units are viewed in their entirety as substitutable does not
require that there be conformity among the individual components.
For example, at given price levels a consumer may view the following
alternatives as economically feasible in terms of his income level and,
therefore, equally attractive:
(1) small country house, low rent, poor public services, and poor
accessibility;
(2)

large suburban house, high rent, good public services, and
moderate accessibility;

(3)

small urban home, moderate rent and public services, and
excellent accessibility.

Therefore, such substitutability as characterizes sub-markets suggests
that the utility of units relative to the total utility schedules of consumers and prevailing housing and non-housing price levels is the
same for all units in the sub-markets.
49. For additional notes on the concept of housing sub-markets, see W.
supra note 28, at 30-82.

50. M. REID, HOUSING AND
ECONOMICS OF HOUSING 15-16 (A.

INCOME

(1962);

Nevitt ed. 1967).

GRIGSBY,

Muth, Slums and Poverty, in

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1972], Art. 3
MAY

1972]

COMMENTS

It is the interaction of the supply and demand for units which
results in the differentiation of sub-markets by income level. This
occurs as a result of competition for units among consumers subject
to variation in income constraints. For example, although low income
persons might be indifferent in choosing between an urban and suburban home, the suburban home may enter high into the utility function
of a middle income consumer who will outbid the low-income consumer for access to the suburban unit. Thus, through price competition, lower income consumers are successively precluded from
housing sub-markets by higher income consumers. A queuing of
consumers occurs across the quality spectrum of available housing
packages, thus further defining individual sub-markets.
An established queuing structure across a continuum of submarkets is not a static phenomenon. Indeed, casual observation indicates that there exists a process of housing unit (and neighborhood)
transition, whereby units become elements of supply in successively
lower income sub-markets. Such movement between sub-markets is
called filtering, which here will be defined as the descent of units into
successively lower sub-markets as differentiated by income. 5 '
Descent here should be viewed as a secular trend, by no means
consistent at each point in time. For example, consider the once
widespread phenomenon of "blockbusting." Blockbusting involved the
purchase of homes initially at premiums by realty agents in areas
primarily occupied by low income whites. The units were then resold
at a substantial mark-up to moderate income blacks who had been
precluded from alternative accommodations due to discrimination.
Unless the neighborhood stabilizes in terms of the economic means of
its residents, these units will again be resold, probably to lower income
blacks. The units involved are part of the filtering process despite
the fact that at one time they had appreciated in price, and in terms of
income levels of the occupants.52 Such periodic price appreciation is
probably an integral part of filtering especially where the interfaces
of dual sub-markets are being crossed. Similarly, not all units filter.
Throughout the south, for example, antebellum mansions and units of
similar income level sub-markets are largely occupied by gentlemen
of the same social stature as those who oversaw the construction of
these homes. 53
51. Filtering is perhaps the only concept original to housing studies. For a brief
discussion of filtering, see H. WOLMAN, supra note 1, at 22-25. For a detailed
discussion, see W. GRIGSBY, supra note 28, at 84-130.
52. Smolensky, Becker & Molotch, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Ghetto Expansion, 44 LAND ECON. 419, 422 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Smolensky].

53. To name just one example, the Belle Mead area of Nashville, Tennessee.
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Filtering occurs as the result of changes within the total stock of
housing and relative changes between components in housing packages.
The process is largely precipitated by new construction at the upper
end of the quality spectrum. Where new housing is introduced,
consumers in high income levels are presented with opportunities for
improved housing.
As high income consumers leave their previous dwellings to enter
new ones, vacancies are created within the premium stock. The effect
of vacancies is to increase the supply of premium housing on the
market, and thus to decrease its sale price. Consumers within slightly
lower income levels now find that they can afford superior housing,
and move into premium housing neighborhoods. Again, these consumers create vacancies within the stock they have left, presenting
opportunities for consumers at still lower income levels to acquire
improved housing. Ideally, the process continues until there is adjustment of units across all sub-markets and every consumer occupies
improved housing. At the lowest income levels, vacancies and abandonments increase with the worst units presumably being removed from
the stock entirely through demolition.
The process appears straightforward, but in fact may not be
operative throughout the entire continuum of sub-markets, and may
often have ambiguous results among consumers at low income levels.
Much depends upon the linkages between sub-markets, i.e., the activity
of consumers operating at the margins of the sub-markets. It is the
marginal consumers, the consumers who have only narrowly been
excluded from better homes by the pricing structure, who first respond
to vacancies and declines in rent within the sub-market immediately
above their own. When these marginal consumers are slow to respond,
and clearly there are substantial constraints upon their response, filtering is impeded.
Perhaps the major constraint is the simple cost of moving. This
cost is substantial both when measured in monetary terms and in terms
of the psychological stress of being "up-rooted" from a familiar
environment. The decision to move may be viewed as an investment
decision concerning utility. The consumer, in making this decision,
compares the personal value or utility of his present residence and
all its components with the value of alternative housing packages less
the monetary and psychological costs of moving. In general, the
greater the cost of moving, the more inelastic will be the consumer's
demand for housing relative to price changes in sub-markets immediately above his own. As a result, the price of housing in the next
sub-market must fall greatly before the marginal consumer will pur-
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chase units in that sub-market. Because residents of higher submarkets usually must be able, or believe that they are able, to sell
their own unit before they will purchase a newly constructed or better
quality one, the effect of this inelasticity of demand among marginal
consumers is eventually to decrease demand for new units, and thus,
to slow the filtering process.
Moreover, demographic and income trends may have substantial
impact upon the extent of filtering. Suppose rates of new construction
are high and vacancies are being created within premium sub-markets.
Suppose further that coincidental with this new construction is a
marked increase in the rate of family formation among individuals
at medium income levels. Potentially, the increase in middle income
consumers may take up the slack across the newly created sub-markets
by prohibiting any units from filtering down to low income consumers.
Finally, even if filtering were to work well, wherein a sufficient
number of better quality units were continually brought into lowincome sub-markets so as to alleviate the demand for substandard
units, the housing needs of the poor might still not be met. This
becomes apparent when one considers that the concept of standard
and substandard relates only to the physical component of the housing package, totally disregarding the environmental and locational
components.
As one commentator suggests, "a most evident characteristic"
of low income housing markets is:
• ..that the demand is not merely for more space or for better
space, but for a package of environmental changes. In other words,
those who see filtering as a solution to the housing demands of
the underhoused will be disappointed because filtering does not
meet all the demand requirements of the underhoused. 4
Such disappointment is most likely to arise where the locational patterns of low income families arising from "successful" filtering continue
to be characterized by concentration and centralization. The social
welfare aspects of "successful" filtering in such an instance would be
similar to, and equally as unsatisfactory as, those of public housing. It
is universally acknowledged that "public housing projects have merely
relocated the slum, not changed it" 55 - despite the fact that public
housing units are not only of standard quality, but are newly constructed. Though certain of the inadequacies of public housing have
arisen from design characteristics (inadequacies which would largely
54. Case, Housing Demand Characteristicsof Underhoused Families it the Inner
City, in 3 ANNALS OF REGIONAL ScI. 15, 19 (1969).

55. H.

WOLMAN,

supra note 1, at 32.
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be avoided if filtering were successful), the source of many of the
difficulties of public housing continues to be the concentration of the
poor in the worst social environments of the city. Thus, improved
filtering would not seem to be the final answer to the housing needs
of the poor unless accompanied by a comprehensive governmentinitiated program of relocation and other forms of public assistance.
Such a policy would seem to run directly contrary to the needs
of the poor as these have been articulated in recent years by leaders
within low-income areas. An unavoidable consequence of the policy
recommended is the diffusion of the poor over the metropolitan area
which would appear to severely limit the ability of such citizens to
exert any unified political influence. If improvement in the living
conditions of low income families is functionally related to their
capacity to exert political influence, a calculus which would seem
historically valid, then a program of relocation would work a disservice
to the poor by frustrating any potential for greater political power.
Filtering to this point has been discussed primarily in terms of a
market phenomenon precipitated by additions to the total housing
stock through new construction. Yet within the standing stock, quite
apart from new construction, changes in the relationship of units may
occur which are an integral element of filtering. Housing sub-markets
need not be locationally specific, and within any neighborhood all
units need not be an element of supply within the same sub-market.
Nonetheless, there is a tendency toward locationally specific submarket homogeneity that occurs because three components of the

housing commodity are inherently locationally specific. These include
the environmental, social service, and accessibility components. This
suggests that heterogeneity of sub-markets within neighborhoods is
primarily a function of variation in the physical component of the
stock. For example, on a single block one might observe a well-kept
garden apartment complex with relatively high rentals, co-existing with

a series of less well-kept units with relatively low rentals. Presumably,
the differentiation of the sub-markets within this block occurs because
the landlord of the apartment complex finds it profitable to invest
heavily in maintenance of the complex to the extent that its physical
superiority to other structures in the area results from maintenance.
Yet the position of the landlord is precarious, for the tenants of the
complex are experiencing the same environmental, social service, and
accessibility benefits as the residents of neighboring structures. Tenants
of the complex are indifferent to making a choice between their
present accommodations and alternative units they can afford because
either the rents are lower, or physical maintenance higher, than could
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be acquired elsewhere. It is therefore necessary for the landlord to
maintain a ratio of rents to maintenance expenses which is decidedly
lower than those of landlords within the same sub-markets, whose
properties enjoy greater environmental benefits.
However, it can be anticipated that neighborhood units will become
even less well-kept, reducing the environmental amenities in the
neighborhood still further, and that the inherent aging process will
require greater expenditures to maintain the apartment complex. Thus,
over time, the ratio of rents to maintenance expenditures will continue
to decline, reducing the return on the landlord's investment. When
this occurs the landlord is faced with several alternatives:
(1) Retain the property, increase maintenance expenditures and
operate at reduced profit, or at a loss;
(2) Sell the building and invest elsewhere; or
(3)

Reduce maintenance expenses, encouraging present tenants to
leave and permit rents to decline such that the complex
becomes an element of supply in a lower sub-market.

The first option is probably untenable, and the last two have a
similar impact upon the complex - the complex is eased into a lower
sub-market, and may even become an element contributing to the
general decline of maintenance throughout the neighborhood. This
situation will be exacerbated if the landlord subdivides and converts
the larger units into smaller, more crowded apartments. At the middle
of the quality spectrum, it is through this process that premium
housing becomes "worker" housing. At the lower end of the spectrum,
this is the process through which the marginal neighborhood becomes
a slum, and eventually, a "crisis" ghetto.5 6
The central dilemma is fairly simple: current tenants cannot or
will not pay the rents required by landlords to justify the required
level of maintenance investment. Thus, the landlord disinvests, and
to the extent tenants are slow to move, or supply conditions are tight,
disinvestment may result in exorbitant, albeit short-term profits.
Finally, however, the unit will fall to such a state of disrepair that
only tenants of the lowest income level, whose only options are the
hovel or the street, will occupy the structure. At this point, the landlord will retain the building only so long as expenses are covered and
it is worthwhile to collect rents. Beyond this point, the landlord will
simply abandon the building.
56. CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CHANGE, NAT'L URBAN
SURVEY OF HOUSING ABANDONMENT 15 (1971).
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Inherent in the preceding analysis is the belief that housing is
but one of the elements integrally related to what is perhaps the hardest
question of our times, why a supposedly "affluent society" continues
to lack the capacity or will to confront the needs of its low-income
citizens. The process of housing quality deterioration and neighborhood decline are significant factors in providing an answer to this
question. Where the element of racial discrimination is considered,
another dimension is added to the question.
III.

QUESTIONS OF LOCATION

A.

AND DISCRIMINATION

Theories of Residential Location

Having viewed in general some basic concepts involved in the
operation of housing markets, attention is now turned to a brief discussion of the elements involved in the consumer's choice of a dwelling
unit, the importance of the location of that unit and the results of
certain barriers to free consumer choice on the operations of housing
markets.
The decision of a consumer to purchase housing of a given
quantity and quality and at a given location is of critical importance
to that consumer's future well-being. Furthermore, there is little
doubt that residential location greatly influences the structure of cities
and the distribution of activities within urban areas. That is, residential location, to a large degree, determines the location of a wide
variety of additional activities in a city, including retail trade, schools,
parks, and fire and police services. More important to this discussion,
the welfare of a city's or region's population is to a great extent influenced and determined by the relation of residential location to the
location of jobs, health, recreation, and open space use. No doubt,
residential location has a strong effect on the quality of lives people
enjoy and the stability of neighborhoods in which they live.
In recent years much effort by city and regional planners and
' 57
economists has been devoted to attempting to develop a "model
of residential location capable of explaining patterns of urban growth
and development. " Of special importance to the present discussion
57. The term "model" is generally defined as a somewhat simplified abstraction
from the real world but with an additional emphasis in this context. The purpose
of these models of residential location is to simulate real world operations, either by
the use of a mechanical analogy or, more importantly, by the operation of a computer
process. For a more expansive definition, see Harris, New Tools for Planning,

31 J. AM.

INST. PLANNERS

90-94 (1965).

58. For an excellent discussion of the major concepts involved in simulating urban
development, see Harris, Quantitative Models of Urban Development: Their Role
in Metropolitan Policy-Making, in ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 363 (H. Perloff &
L. Wingo ed. 1968).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1972], Art. 3

MAY

1972]

COMMENTS

is that group of models which have as their theoretical basis concepts
of residential location based on the operations of the land and housing
markets. Essentially, this model would attempt to answer two economic questions: (1) What are people's preference structures for
housing and other goods; and (2) How does the market for such
goods resolve these preferences and deliver these goods as required.
Many individuals have contributed to this effort to describe
and simulate residential location with varying results.59 Many, however, have used a common conceptual framework only recently developed."0 Residential location is viewed as a trade-off between the
desire for more living space and the desire for easy access to places
of employment, shopping, recreation, and services - "[s]pacious living
versus easy access," as the locational decision has been called. 6
The following is a simplified presentation of this decision: Parcels
of land closer to the center or centers of an urban area are more
accessible62 to various places of employment and services. Consequently,
since these areas are more desirable, demand is high and site rents
for the land is high. Or, stated generally, as distance decreases from
the center of a city, accessibility decreases and site rents decrease as a
function of decreased accessibility. Similarly, transportation costs increase as the distance increases. Any decision by a housing consumer
to locate at a given area is based upon a weighing of the relative
utilities of savings in site rents at a given distance from the center
of a city versus the transportation costs incurred due to the increased
or decreased accessibility of the site.6"
Individual households acting as above then compete with each
other for all sites in the metropolitan area. All households, within a
given income and preference structure for location and other goods,
59. See, e.g.,

CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY

OF

CALIFORNIA, JOBS, PEOPLE AND LAND (1966) ; J. CRECINE, A TIME ORIENTED
METROPOLITAN MODEL FOR SPATIAL LOCATION (Pittsburgh Community Renewal Program, Technical Bull. No. 6, 1964) ; J. HERBERT & B. STEVENS, A MODEL FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDENTIAL ACTIVITIES IN URBAN AREAS (Penn-Jersey Transp.
Study Paper No. 2, Pennsylvania State Dep't of Highways, 1960) ; I. LOWERY, A
MODEL OF METROPOLIS (The Rand Corp. Mem. Rm-4035-RC, 1964); J. NATHANSON
& L. ROSENBERG, AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF METROPOLITAN HOUSING AND LOCATION

(Research for the Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 1966).
CHOICE

60. W.
LAND RENT

ALONso, LOCATION AND LAND USE -

(1964).

TOWARD

A

GENERAL THEORY OF

61. J. KAIN, THEORIES OF RESIDENTIAL LOCATION AND REALITIES OF RACE
(Harvard University Program on Regional and Urban Economics, No. 47, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as J. KAIN].

62. For a thorough discussion of accessibility and its relation to land use, see
Hansen, How Accessibility Shapes Land Use, 25 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 73 (1959).
63. "Economic theories of residential location explain the locational choices of

urban households by means of a trade-off between savings in location or site rents
obtained by commuting further from work and the larger transportation costs
thereby incurred." J. KAIN, supra note 61, at 9.
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compete for and are located at a given site, having a certain size and
transportation cost, as a function of the operation of the market.
Those households which prefer to live in low density areas will
be encouraged by larger site rent savings to travel longer distances
to and from work. Those sites near workplaces will be inhabited by
those who require or desire high accessibility and consequently lower
transportation costs. Due to higher site rents, those households which
live in higher density areas, while receiving a greater savings in
transportation costs, will necessarily purchase smaller quantities of space.
This theory goes far in explaining the present patterns of urban
residential location. Those consumers with high income and high space
demands live in suburban areas, those with lower incomes in the central
part of the cities. Higher income people live in the suburbs because
their higher space desires result in a substantial rent savings in the
suburbs compared to the center city, which is not sufficiently offset by
increased transportation costs. They are willing and able to bid more
for suburban land and therefore locate there. Similarly, less affluent
persons are more constrained by increased transportation costs and
must therefore adjust their space and locational desires accordingly.
Only those with very high incomes and a desire for high accessibility
will be able to achieve both high space consumption and high
accessibility in the center city.64
This theory of residential location also helps illustrate the historical growth of the city.65 Successive waves of suburbanization (first
within the city limits, later outside its limits) have characterized the
growth of American cities since the 1800's. As transportation technology advanced with trolley, commuter trains, public transit, and
later automobiles and super highways, and improved accessibility of
"outlying" sites, those who desired more space and could afford
to
pay increased transportation costs moved out of the "congested city."
The housing left by this more affluent class was occupied by those
with lower incomes. Housing units were often converted to meet the
new needs and lower incomes of the new residents. In short, housing
filtered down throughout the city. Those with low incomes have
always occupied the oldest housing in the city, usually at high densities;
that was all they could afford. Slowly, neighborhoods changed as
residents moved and the city grew. Such patterns of growth and
deterioration have operated in the past and will probably continue in
the future unless major changes in transportation or communications
64. Id. at 10-20.
65. For an excellent short description of the urban growth-deterioration process,

see E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY
UJRBAN CRISIS

CITY -

THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF OUR

23-45 (1968).
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technology, or the preference of Americans for more and more space,
determine a new urban form.
B.

Market Discrimination and Dual Housing Sub-Markets

While the recently developing concepts of housing market operations and residential location theory have been most valuable in explaining the complexities of housing problems, certain distinctive housing market features have received far less systematic treatment. One
factor in particular - racial discrimination in housing - is a major
and somewhat neglected feature of the operation of housing markets.
This is particularly important when discussing housing code programs,
rehabilitation policies, or in general, any program designed to improve
existing housing in large American cities.
Any analysis of the effect of racial discrimination on the behavior
of housing markets and the patterns of residential location must begin
with a clear understanding of the extent and degree of residential
segregation in American urban areas. While there has been a major
migration of nonwhites into urban areas from the rural South since
the Second World War, this nonwhite population has not similarly
participated in the major post-war suburbanization of American cities.
Nonwhites comprise an ever increasing percentage of the population
of most American center cities, while the nonwhite portion of the
suburban population has remained relatively unchanged. This pattern
of nonwhite segregation is, for the most part, a uniformly established
trend throughout the nation and remains a predominant population
trend in American cities. "Unfortunately, there is more than a germ
of truth to the characterization of an increasingly black central city
'
being strangled by a noose of white suburbs." 66
Further, racial residential segregation does not end with nonwhite
exclusion from suburban areas. Nonwhites are highly segregated in
most American central cities. Studies in the 1960's calculated a "segregation index" for the central cities which measured the extent to which
observed racial patterns of residence by city blocks differed from a
pattern of normal proportional representation without a racial difference. The results showed a remarkable pattern of racial segregation
by residence in all the 156 cities studied. 7 Other studies, using
different methods, have found quite similar results.68 It is clear that
66. J.KAIN, supra note 61, at 2.
67. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER,
cited as K. TAEUBER].

NEGROES IN

CITIES

69-95 (1965)

[hereinafter

68. D. Lee, Analysis and Description of Residential Segregation 130-50 (unpub-

lished masters thesis, Cornell University, 1967).
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racially segregated housing patterns and location is a major factor in
the makeup of American cities.
It is possible, of course, to hypothesize that the segregation of
nonwhites was not a function of racial discrimination but more
correctly the result of a composite of other socio-economic factors
such as lower real incomes, and lower nonwhite preferences for housing.
While there is, no doubt, some truth to this socio-economic argument,
several individuals have raised serious questions regarding the explanatory value of this hypothesis.69 Others have examined locational
patterns of whites and nonwhites to determine if income was a major
factor in nonwhite residential segregation, and results indicate that
income and expenditure differences alone could not explain the resultant
segregated patterns." Thus, while it is clear that income and housing
expenditure differences between whites and nonwhites have certain
effects on locational patterns, it is equally evident that these factors,
taken together, have not been proved to be a major cause of segregation.
Another prevalent explanation for the residential segregation of
nonwhites in America lies in the desire of nonwhites, as separate
racial minorities, to group together in racial enclaves, a pattern similar
to that employed by other ethnic minorities in American cities. No
doubt, there is considerable emphasis today in black and Puerto Rican
areas of the city on community development and solidarity. These
factors, however, are quite difficult to measure or analyze. Yet studies
have indicated that "[r]acial residential segregation is clearly more
pronounced than class or ethnic residential segregation, and it is a
7
universal feature of American urban society." '

It has also been stated that black and Puerto Rican segregation
is "far greater than that documented for any other identifiable subgroup in American history. '' 72 Thus, while it is difficult to measure
completely the effect of racial self-segregation, it seems highly unlikely
that nonwhite citizens would so greatly value solidarity that they
would limit their residential location choices to the degree present
patterns indicate. A clear measure of nonwhite self-segregation will
69. After making substantial adjustment for income and housing expenditure
differences between whites and nonwhites, researchers found that, even including these
differences, massive segregation resulted. The Taeuber's concluded: "According to
the model [referring to segregation indexes adjusted for income], the net effect of
economic factors explaining residential segregation is slight." K. TAEUBER, supra
note 67, at 94.
70. Using 1960 Bureau of the Census data for population and income for the
ten largest standard metropolitan statistical areas in the United States, Kain found
that income was not a sufficient explanation for housing segregation of racial
minorities. J. KAIN, supra note 61, at 5-6.
71. Taeuber, Negro Residential Segregation: Trends and Measurement, 12
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 42, 47 (1964).
72. J. KAIN, supra note 61, at 6.
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probably not be possible until more all white areas are open for
nonwhite occupancy. Thus, present knowledge strongly suggests that
the value of the self-segregation hypothesis in explaining racial segregation in housing is quite less than is widely accepted.
A similar argument is often presented regarding taste or family
style variables in the nonwhite housing demand, which basically posits
that nonwhite tastes for housing and other goods, and variations in
life style, voluntarily restrict nonwhite housing purchases to existing
nonwhite areas. However, all of these arguments are incapable in
themselves of explaining the existing patterns of national residential
segregation. All are, no doubt, important in determining the preference
structure of individual families, but in the aggregate, it is difficult to
believe that such variations in individual preferences could result in
73
such a clearly segregated locational picture.
A serious question remains. While each of the arguments examined has been rejected as insufficient separately to produce the level
of segregation currently existing, could these arguments as an interacting group explain the degree of racial residential segregation in America? While doubtless these arguments have some explanatory value, it
is the position of this discussion that low incomes and variations in
nonwhite taste, life style and expenditure behavior cannot in themselves
explain the widespread patterns of racial segregation existing in American cities. Moreover, it is submitted that racial discrimination is the
primary factor in residential segregation by race. Such discrimination
is largely beyond the control of the nonwhite population and is in
effect an operational outgrowth of white racism. This segregation
should be more correctly viewed as the logical extension of housing
market discriminatory practices. These practices involve not only
the prejudices of a majority of whites in America, but also the collusion
of the housing industry, government and other institutions. 4
These racially discriminatory housing practices of past years
are well documented and are today, for the most part, illegal. 5 Racially
73. Id. at 8.
74. Racial discrimination in housing markets is administered largely by the
housing industry in conjunction with the actions of individual buyers and sellers in
the market. Real estate practices have received special attention on this point.
For a recent summary of practices and attitudes, see R.

HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND

277-97 (1969).
75. Builders and financial institutions have likewise used discriminatory practices
in the past. CoMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 26-29
PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS

(1958) [hereinafter cited as WHERE SHALL WE LIVE]. Open housing legislation to
prevent racial discrimination in housing was finally passed on a federal level in 1968.

Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
The federal courts have also been instrumental in removing restrictions on
the right of an individual to purchase or sell housing because of race. See, e.g.,

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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restrictive covenants, clearly stated racially oriented appraisal practices, and the financing policies of private and public institutions
led to a clear program of housing discrimination. Moreover, while
recent laws and court decisions have eliminated the most blatant
discriminatory practices, the pattern of past segregation resulting from
these practices will long be with us. Crucial to this issue is that
while the more obvious practices have been eliminated, additional and
more subtle methods have often taken their place. 76 The nature and
extent of this discrimination has important implications for the operation of housing markets and the growth and development of urban areas.
The most important result of this racial discrimination in housing,
for this discussion, are the effects of discrimination on the operation
of the housing market and the ability of the consumer to purchase
housing. It seems clear that discrimination in housing and the resultant
segregated housing patterns it causes, act to supply inferior dwellings
to nonwhites at higher rents.77 Although recent studies have questioned this conclusion, most students of housing accept the view that
discrimination in housing does cause nonwhites to pay more than
whites for units of similar quality.7" To examine this question in
greater depth it is necessary to more fully discuss the effect of racial
discrimination on the operation of the housing market.
To explain it in its simplest form, discrimination forces the creation of dual housing sub-markets, white and nonwhite. Whites are
able to purchase housing services anywhere in the urban area, income
permitting. Nonwhites can purchase housing services only in neighborhoods that are prescribed by custom and practice for nonwhite occupancy. Additions to the nonwhite housing supply come, not from new
construction, but rather from shifts of units from white to nonwhite
markets. Units are added to the nonwhite supply only when prices
which consumers in the nonwhite housing market are willing to pay
exceed those in the white market by an amount sufficient to overcome
76. Further, although the discriminatory practices of federal housing agencies
have been eliminated to a large degree, the programs of these agencies often appear
to be designed to produce segregated housing patterns. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD,
436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. For a more complete discussion of these results, see D. MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE
AND RACE 60-65 (1960) ; Rapkin, Price DiscriminationAgainst Negroes in the Rental
Housing Market, in ESSAY IN URBAN LAND EcoNoMics 355 (1966); Langendorf,
Residential Desegregation Potential, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 90-96 (1969).

78. Richard Muth, in his studies of Chicago, found little support for the hypothesis that Negroes paid higher prices for housing of a given quality as a result
of racial segregation. However, it can be argued that Muth's concept of discrimination
based on a price mark-up is too limited and does not include such factors as loss of
opportunities through discrimination or restriction of housing choice and location.
R. MUTH, supra note 28, at 238.
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white resistance to nonwhite occupancy This is the basis for what is
called the discrimination mark-up. 9
Since nonwhites are seldom purchasers of newly constructed
homes, either due to discrimination or lack of income, the nonwhite
supply of housing, necessary to meet growing population needs and to
eliminate substandard housing, can expand only by converting units
in a white housing sub-market to a nonwhite sub-market, generally
at the fringes of existing nonwhite areas. This enables the white submarkets to control the supply of nonwhite housing and either channel
increasing nonwhite demand into existing nonwhite areas or limit
the growth of nonwhite areas to housing primarily on the fringe of
nonwhite areas.
Due to this artificial restriction on supply existing in the nonwhite
housing market, a pent up demand for housing is built up across the
whole nonwhite income distribution. The rapidly increasing nonwhite
population in most urban areas creates a tremendous pressure to convert
from white to nonwhite occupancy in certain areas. Since very low
incomes are more numerous in the nonwhite areas, the demand for
low income housing in nonwhite areas is very high. This pressure
often acts to convert standard housing into smaller units, which are
more affordable to low income consumers." °
Ultimately, nonwhite pressure demands for housing will force
the conversion of units from white to nonwhite occupancy. However,
since this pressure is usually restricted to a small number of areas
due to market discrimination, its effects are usually difficult to predict.
The effect of this nonwhite entry on prices depends on two factors:
(1) "[T]he degree to which such a shift from white to nonwhite
market segments takes place . . ."" and (2) "[The] differences
between white and nonwhite demand for housing of a given type. The
first factor simply determines the degree to which the second factor
becomes operative .... )P82
Notwithstanding, it is likely that the attitudes of whites will determine the final outcome of nonwhite entry on prices, and neighborhood
conditions. If white demand remains high and whites do not rush to
leave the area, the area may stabilize and prices and conditions will
also stabilize and may even increase. On the other hand, if white
79. J.
SHIP, AND

KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKET DISCRIMINATION, HOME OWNERSAVINGS BEHAVIOR 3 (Harvard University Program on Regional and

Urban Economics, No. 58, 1970).
80. For an excellent theoretical description of the process stated above, see
Downs, An Economic Analysis of Property Values and Race, 36 LAND EcoN. 181-88
(1960).
81. Id. at 184.
82. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss5/3

26

Buckley and Conley: Housing Market Operations and the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding A

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOTL. 17

demand substantially decreases and a substantial number of white
occupants sell, prices may rise or fall in response to a variety of factors."3
The conversion of housing units from the white to nonwhite
sub-markets generally occurs in a recurring pattern:
Two principle factors conducive to racial transition in neighborhoods are the restricted supply of housing available to nonwhites and the pressure of a growing population for more living
space. When a particular area is open to nonwhites, they tend to
crowd into it because of their need and lack of alternatives .... ..
Middle income nonwhites, seeking more space, better housing and
environment, purchase housing in previously all white areas, usually
at a substantial discrimination price mark-up. 5 This almost always
results in a decrease in white demand in that area for housing.
Since nonwhite middle income demand is usually quite intense
(due to increasing real incomes and denial of housing opportunities
in other areas), nonwhites will usually quickly purchase housing in
changing areas. As nonwhite immigration increases in an area, white
demand decreases. Additionally, whites, fearing the massive influx
of nonwhites and the ultimate lowering of property values, sell out
and move to other white areas. Due to generally lower nonwhite
incomes, however, the nonwhite middle income demand for housing,
though intense, is not as expansive as the white market. The corresponding decreased white demand and outmigration from the area
dictates that the supply of available units on the market be primarily
converted to nonwhite occupancy. But, since nonwhite middle income
demand is not so widespread, the market is initially glutted with units.
As prices fall and overall property values decrease, lower income nonwhites are drawn to the area by the lower prices. Often housing units
must be converted to more intensive use to meet this new lower income
demand with its corresponding demand for lower effective space. The
neighborhood then begins to rapidly deteriorate, more whites leave,
and a panic ensues. There is little doubt that the future of a neighborhood is determined by the ability of the white market to sustain the
high white demand for housing in a transitional neighborhood. The
83. There are numerous studies of the effects on property values of racial changes
in neighborhoods. See, e.g., W. GRIGSBY & C. RAPKIN, THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING
IN RACIALLY MIXED AREAS (1960) ; Baily, Effects of Race and of Other Demographic
Factors on the Values of a Single-Family Home, 42 LAND EcoN. 215 (1966);
Marcus, Racial Composition and Home Price Changes: A Case Study, 34 J. AM.
INST. PLANNERS 334 (1968);
Wolf, The Tipping-Point in Racially Changing
Neigborhoods, 29 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 217 (1963).

84.
IN

WHERE SHALL

WE LIVE, supra note 75, at 21.

85. For case studies, see L.
SEVEN CITIES (1960).

LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE -
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white market has long believed that nonwhite entry will eventually
decrease property values. This belief has further been the justification
for both past and present discriminatory practices by the housing industry. Initially, whites appear to believe that nonwhite entry converts
low density, high maintenance neighborhoods into high density, low
maintenance slums. Additionally, most whites would rather move than
live with nonwhites, which results in "panic" selling. In a real sense
such attitudes become self-fulfilling prophesy.
The effects of racial discrimination on housing market operations
are most important to this discussion. Traditional concepts, such as
"filtering," are greatly affected by the existence of dual sub-markets.
Since the supply of nonwhite housing is often restricted in size and
location, code programs, urban renewal or highway demolitions, indeed any program that threatens to further decrease the nonwhite
supply of housing, both standard and substandard, must be cautiously
viewed. To further restrict the nonwhite supply of housing through
public programs may drive up prices and rents, force nonwhite demand
into other areas, or force the conversion of units into more intensive
use.
In recapitulation, housing policy questions have been viewed
from a variety of perspectives, with an eye toward the importance
of federal housing policy upon state and local housing goals and
programs. The effects of the operations of housing markets and
several special parameters of low income housing sub-markets have
been seen. Moreover, it has been indicated that racial discrimination
retards the normal market operations and presents special problems
in dealing with inner city housing questions. This discussion now
undertakes to apply the various policy considerations to a specific
economic analysis of the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act.
IV.

AN ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF THE RENT WITHHOLDING

A.

ACT

Policy Objectives

There exists a rather diverse set of goals which either have been,
or potentially could be attributed to rent withholding. Some of these
goals could be served in a like manner by any form of code enforcement, while others are unique to rent withholding. Some specific goals
posited and which will be considered here include the following:
(1) Expansion of the stock of standard housing;
(2)

Provision of consumer protection;

(3)

Redistribution of national wealth;
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(4) Enhancement of the political and social efficacy of the poor;
(5)

Provision of an insurance mechanism for private investment.

It will be demonstrated that in the long run the capacity of rent
withholding to provide increased consumer protection is dependent
upon how effectively the first goal, expansion of the standard stock,
is met. It will likewise be shown that the usefulness of rent withholding as a redistributive mechanism is quite limited, not only because
very little redistribution occurs, but because much of what does occur
is essentially between inappropriate groups - the lower middle class
and the poor. Rent withholding, as the analysis will indicate, could
enhance the political and social efficacy of the poor if that were perceived as a source of power. It is difficult, however, to estimate how
significant a factor rent withholding could be when applied to this
purpose. Finally, the insurance aspects of rent withholding, and the
protection it might afford homeowners, will be considered.
B.
1.

Economic Evaluation

Expansion of the Standard Stock

The immediate and obvious effect of a successful rent withholding
effort would seem to be the rehabilitation of a substandard dwelling
such that it could be classified as standard. This is not, however, the
only means by which rent withholding can increase the stock of standard units in low-income sub-markets. Indeed, if other of the goals
described above were met, the stock of standard housing might well
increase. Likewise, if the standard stock were increased, several of
the above goals might also be achieved.
The ability of rent withholding and other enforcement tools to
increase the number of standard units - presumably the fundamental
goal of all housing policy - is an issue of no small importance. Rent
withholding, like every other means of code enforcement over the
quality of structures, is directed specifically toward initiating changes
in the physical quality of individual units. Wherever code enforcement
is widespread the environmental component of housing within neighborhoods may be greatly affected. Moreover, the chain of causation
between code enforcement and all the diverse effects which issue
therefrom begins with alteration of the physical quality of the unit.
The relationship of rent withholding to the supply of standard
housing can be seen upon investigation of the possible outcomes of
efforts by tenants to obtain improvement of the units they occupy.
Given that the tenant-landlord relationship has deteriorated to the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1972], Art. 3
MAY

1972]

COMMENTS

extent that the tenant has successfully brought to bear the power
of government to effectuate rehabilitation of the unit, the future of
the unit is limited to two options: it will be improved, or it will be
abandoned.
The choice between these outcomes is made by the landlord
whose decision relates to a single question: will investment in the
unit produce greater profit or personal benefit than abandonment? In
a purely monetary analysis this decision involves consideration of the
following variables, and functional relationships: the income stream
the unit can be anticipated to generate, the relationship of the income
stream to investment, the cost of capital, and alternative investment
opportunities which may be available.
The landlord's decision involving these variables may be structured
within any one of several investment decision equations, one of which
is presented below:
n

: (Rj-Cj-OJ-An)
j=1

-

Al

(1+r)j

In this equation, if the numerical quantity obtained by the summation formula is greater than zero, then the landlord should invest
the sum of Cj in housing improvements. The terms of the formula
are as follows:
Cj = the capital improvement expenditure for year
Rj = the annual rent for year

j

j

A 1 = the cost of immediate abandonment (i.e., in year 1)
An = the cost of abandonment at some future year, n
O" = the operating expenditures for year

j

r = the prevailing market rate of interest, or the highest anticipated rate of return on an alternate investment of Cj

]

= 1, 2, 3, . . . n, which equals the time periods from the
present year to year n; year n is defined as the end of the
economic life of the unit, given the rates of improvement
and maintenance expenditures, Cj & Oj

The above equation is a net present value formula for evaluating
alternative options in rental housing capital investments and may be
read as follows: the summation from year 1 to n, of R minus C minus
0 minus An divided by the quantity (1--r) to the power of year 1
to n, all minus the cost of abandonment, A 1 , in year 1 only. The
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equation specifies that, if the aggregate of the anticipated return on
the investment (summation of R]) minus the costs (summation of
Cf, 0, and An), after having been discounted by the operator (1 -- r)',
all minus the cost of present abandonment (A 1 ), is greater than zero,
then the landlord should invest the sum Cf and not abandon the unit.
The operator (1+r)i is the discount mechanism necessary to calculate
the present value of the terms in the formula, Rf, Cf, Of, An, at a
given rate of return, r. This is a standard economic operator which
enables comparisons to be made between income streams of varying

lengths of time. The formula enables a landlord to determine the
maximum dollar value of the capital expenditure he may utilize without realizing a loss. Moreover, the capital investment sum, Cf, may
be a lump sum investment, accruing as a cost to the landlord in a
single year, or over a number of years."8
By way of further amplification, the operating expenses, 0, are
largely a recurring cost, and vary as a function of the number of
tenants using the structure, their life style, and the amount of earlier
capital expenditures, if any. The abandonment values, which can be
either positive or negative, are the costs or benefits which accrue to
the landlord upon giving up the structure presently, or at some future
time. The value r is the prevailing rate of interest or a desired rate
of return (adjusted for risk) which the landlord could obtain by
investing the same sum, Cf, in some alternative investment.
Rf, the yearly rent received by the landlord, is a function of the
total prevailing rent structure across the sub-markets. That rent
structure, as has been noted, is determined by the supply and demand
schedules within the sub-markets, across the components of the housing
supply package. The landlord can determine, to a limited extent, the
sub-market in which the unit is sold (and thereby the rent received)
through variation in the physical component of his units. Thus, the
landlord, forced to make a decision to invest in the unit, has the option
of making improvements beyond those required by law, on the hope
of entering the unit into a sub-market in which higher rents prevail.
This is to say that though Cf has a minimum value (that amount
required to bring the unit up to standard), it need not be limited to
a minimum value only. However, the landlord's ability to enter a
higher sub-market is severely limited by the environmental component,
and it is the landlord's prognosis of the trend in this environmental
component -

"where the neighborhood is going" -

which largely,

if not entirely, determines rent expectations and thereby whether the
landlord invests or abandons.
86. Note that alternative levels of Cf must be used to determine the optimal

level of investment
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For purposes of simplification, assume that the rental value which
the landlord can obtain for a unit within a given neighborhood is
primarily determined by the physical and environmental components
of housing supply. Similarly, the physical component is determined
by the amount of capital invested by the landlord in the unit. Thus,
the relationship of rents to the physical and environmental components
can be stated by the following function:
R = f(C,E)
The terms of this formula are as follows:
R = Rents
C = Capital investment
E = Neighborhood environmental quality
Solving for the differentials indicates the changes in rents which
are caused by changes in capital investments and neighborhood quality,
thus:
dC +

DR = df1
dC

df2.

dE

dE

(Note: the symbol "." denotes a multiplication)

The above differential formula, ceteris paribus,"' portrays the rental
value of a unit across stable sub-markets for changes in C and E.
The landlord may determine whether there will be any increase
in capital expenditures, and concommitantly, any change in the physical
component of his unit. It is more difficult, however, to determine
whether any change in the environmental component will ensue. One
may speculate that, along with accessibility, investment by landlords
in the housing stock within a neighborhood largely determines environmental quality: first, by establishing the physical quality of the stock
within the neighborhood; and second, by determining the type of
residents - low, medium, or high income - who can afford to
dwell within the neighborhood. It would seem that all previous investment will have some effect over present environmental quality,
though the more distant the previous investment is in time, the less
will be its present effects. These effects may be represented by the
following double integral equation:
U

E =

f

0

er0+i)ij(t+j)

i=1 j=- n
87. Ceteris paribus can be popularly translated as "all other things equal or all
other things held constant."
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The equation terms are defined as follows:
Et Ij(t-J-])

=

e-r(t+j) =

the neighborhood environmental quality at time t
some investment in a unit, I, at a previous time (t+j),
where t+j is the present time when 1=0
some rate of decay of investment (and consequently
88
of housing quality) as a function of time (t+j)

i =

1,2,3, .

j

-n, -n+l, -n+2, . . . 0, which equals the time period
in which the investment in housing in the neighborhood has occurred at some time n years previous to
the present.

.

. it, which are the units in the neighborhood

This equation specifies that the quality of the neighborhood environment at the present time (Et), is determined by previous investment which has been made in housing within the neighborhood,
(Ij(t+j)), and the rate at which such previous investment decays,
that is, the rate at which a structure will deteriorate, (e-(t+i)).
Et is obtained by summing over all the units in the neighborhood,
(1 through u), and by summing over the time period, (t+j), from
the time of the original investment in the past, (j=-n), through the
present, (j=O). The formula indicates that the environmental component of housing is largely a function of both prior investment in
the unit and a rate of decay of that unit which is related to the passage
of time.
The quality of the neighborhood environment at any future point
in time may also be estimated by the use of a similar double integration
formula:
U

E t+n

n

fr

e'r(t+j)Ii(t+j)

i=1 j=-n
The formula operates in much the same fashion as the preceding one,
except that it solves for Et+n, which denotes some future time. The
summation over time runs from the past (j=-n) to the future (j=n).
Finally, the difference between the solutions for Et and Et+n
in the two preceding integral equations is multiplied by the environment differential of the rent function

fdf 2

I

d- J

as found in the differ-

88. The term e-r(t+i) specifies an undetermined internal rate of decay that takes
the form of a constantly decreasing logarithmic function. The term indicates that
the value of investment property, independent of other factors, functions over time
at a decreasing rate. See J. FORRESTER, URBAN DYNAMIcs 34-35 (1969).
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ential equation on page 918 supra. The product determines the decrement or increment to the rental value of a unit accruing to the landlord as the result of a change in the environment. Presumably, the
landlord will realize this relationship in terms of practicalities, thus
the values of R used in the original discount formula largely reflect
the landlord's subjective evaluation of the activities of other investors,
and thus can be of crucial importance.
From this analysis emerges a pattern which suggests the possible
ill-effects of rent withholding and other forms of code enforcement
upon the standard stock. For those units within the stock against
which code proceedings have been brought but in which landlords do
not believe further investment to be justified, code enforcement simply
hastens the day of abandonment and removal. Abandonment wreaks
an immediate decrement to the quality of the neighborhood environment
by reducing the rental revenues which can be realized from nearby
structures. Although this makes investment less profitable, the effects
do not stop there. If the presence of abandoned buildings within the
community reduces the individual landlord's anticipation of the investment which other landlords will undertake, then there is brought
into effect the basic "prisoner's dilemma" whereby landlords, anticipating each other's mutual action, reduce investment, thereby precipitating
the very decline in the community property values that all wished
to avoid.
To speculate further, it seems that the externalities of disinvestment may be substantially greater than those of investment. This is
to suggest that abandonment of a unit may have a greater impact
upon community decline, than rehabilitation of the unit would have an
impact upon reversing decline. This would occur if abandonments, as
seems probable, are physically and psychologically decisive. Only in
the rarest instances can an abandoned building be reclaimed, and
then only by public as opposed to private investment. Moreover,
public investment has it own ill-effects, for such investment has
considerable symbolic importance, signaling to many investors the
utter collapse of the private market.
The fundamental objection to rent withholding and all other forms
of code enforcement as measures to increase the supply of standard
low-cost housing is that these methods simply do not relate to the
central feature characterizing the low-income housing market: a
lack of effective demand among low-income consumers which consequently cannot support investment of the magnitude necessary to
bring sufficient standard units on the market. Code enforcement does
nothing to increase the buying power of the poor and nothing to
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reduce the cost of capital; thus, it has no direct influence on supply.
Further, if code enforcement or rent withholding results in a substantial number of abandonments, as is likely, then investment in large
measure will be discouraged.
Is there not, however, some indirect way enforcement could stimulate investment by increasing the rents of low income units, or perhaps,
of all housing? The answer is affirmative, if rents in low income
housing markets are significantly and negatively correlated with vacancy rates (the percentage of the stock unoccupied), and if the supply
elasticity of low income housing relative to rents is high. This would
imply that where substandard units are removed from the stock, renters
are squeezed into the housing that remains. This in turn reduces the
number of vacant units, and increases rents bringing more (and
presumably standard) units onto the low cost housing market.
When this proposition is put to an empirical test the results are
somewhat ambiguous. The supply elasticity of housing is as yet
basically unknown."9 No empirical tests have been developed which
have successfully estimated this elasticity and this is perhaps the most
serious gap in our knowledge of housing. Additionally, though vacancies would seem to have a significant impact upon rents, a recent
study suggests that these effects are almost entirely overshadowed by
income considerations. This study suggests that changes in rents
can be explained primarily by changes in the income levels of tenants, °
and that changes in the number of vacancies within the stock have
little effect upon the level of rents. If vacancies have little impact
upon rent, then removals and abandonments induced by code enforcement would likewise appear to have an equally small effect upon rents.
Thus, though it is an extremely tenuous proposition, it would seem
that the effect of vacancies upon the investment in housing and upon
the supply of low income housing may be much less than has been
assumed.
Moreover, advocacy of code enforcement as a method to induce
investment in the stock by reducing supply and thus increasing rental
values has some absurd implications. Such advocacy implies that low
income families should in the short-run be forced to spend a greater
proportion of their income upon housing than they do at present
without any appreciable improvement in housing quality. This is
not to suggest that code enforcement and rent withholding might not
increase this standard stock by preventing the decline of units in
otherwise sound neighborhoods (i.e., those which are predominantly
89. C. RAPKIN, supra note 48, at 35-36.
90. deLeevw & Ekanem, The Suppy of Rental Housing, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 806

(1971).
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middle income occupied). While this is probably the task for which
rent withholding is best suited, it is not the task for which it was
specifically designed, namely that of addressing the problems of low
income tenants occupying the worst units in the stock.91 Moreover,
the success of rent withholding in achieving this result is dependent
upon the prevention of a decline in construction. Whether, or at what
rates, these units would eventually become elements of supply on low
income housing markets is conjecture. In any event, the process would
be a long one. In the short-run, the primary benefit of code enforcement in sound but aging communities could be to stabilize housing
quality and thus to revitalize these communities. Even this, however,
may be a tenuous proposition.
2.

Redistribution of National Wealth

In theory, landlords who have been found in violation of housing
codes are prohibited from passing on to the tenants the cost of any
improvements made. If landlords are effectively prohibited from passing on these costs, then short-run redistribution of income from
landlords to tenants does in fact occur. 2 There exists no empirical
evidence which indicates to what extent landlords may pass along the
cost of improvements to renters. There is, however, evidence which
indicates that landlords believe they can substantially, though not
completely, shift the cost of improvements to their tenants. In a survey
of 41 rental agents conducted in Chicago, 39 per cent believed they
could pass a substantial amount of the increased maintenance costs
along to poor tenants as opposed to 31 per cent who believed it was
impossible to shift costs. 3 Of an additional 124 agents studied, 31
per cent believed that cost could be shifted, whereas only 14 per cent
believed that the landlord could in no way avoid rising costs.9 4
Thus, without superior information, it does not seem entirely
reasonable to assume as some writers have,95 that rent withholding
can lead to a substantial redistribution of income in the short-run.
In the long-run it would seem that the threat of increased code enforcement could be a factor tending to increase rents generally by shifting
91. Grigsby, Economic Aspects of Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAW
534 (1971).
92. For an excellent theoretical example of this principle, see Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971). Moreover,
a proposed amendment to the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act would make it
impossible for a landlord to increase the rent for one year after the repairs have
been made. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971).
93. Smolensky, supra note 52, at 427.

94. Id.
95. Ackerman, supra note 92.
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supply functions through changes in the cost structure of ownership.
Likewise, if in the short-run rent withholding results in abandonments
and a shrinking of supply, then the effects of withholding are to redistribute income among landlords, rather than between landlords
and tenants.
Furthermore, in terms of desirability, income redistribution between so narrow a group of persons as are landlords and the poor,
generally, is somewhat dubious. If George Sternlieb's description of
landlords in Newark may be generalized, then landlords are a rather
diverse group, many of whom are small property holders of no great
means. 6 Though their net wealth may exceed that of their tenants, the
yearly incomes of landlords in many cases may not be substantially
greater than those of tenants, especially where retired landholders
are concerned.
3.

Provision of Consumer Protection

Protection of the rights of the poor and of minorities is a fundamental tenet of democratic ideology, if not always a characteristic of
democratic governments themselves. Within recent years, this tenet
has been expanded and articulated largely by calls for increased "consumer protection." Though the need for consumer protection exists
across all income groups within society, it is the poor who have traditionally suffered the most blatant, recursive and severe exploitation in
the purchase of even those few goods and services of minimal quality
which they can afford. Perhaps nowhere does such exploitation cause
greater injury or have more lasting effects than in the area of housing.
Though it is certainly untrue that every landlord-tenant relationship
is characterized by exploitation, relatively little success has been encountered in efforts to insure that the "exploitive landlords" exercise
greater responsibility in their obligations to tenants.
A primary goal of rent withholding is to provide a mechanism
by which an aggrieved tenant can initiate action in his own behalf
against exploitive, or irresponsible landlords without .incurring great
cost. Clearly, rent withholding does offer potential as a mechanism
for affording greater protection to the low-income consumer. It must,
however, be recognized that this potential can be realized only in those
instances where withholding results in the required rehabilitation of
a unit, or where, if the unit is abandoned, a standard unit is available
to which the tenant may gain access without being penalized by
substantial moving costs or increased rents. This suggests that rent
withholding protects the low-income consumer only where the low96. G. STERNLIEB,

THE TENEMENT LANDLORD

128-39 (1966).
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cost housing market is working well, wherein sufficient vacancies exist
among standard units to accommodate those who must leave abandoned
units, at rents the poor can afford. Thus, where rent withholding
may protect consumers against extraordinary abuses in extreme instances, it provides consumers no general protection that would
guarantee housing of a minimal quality.
4.

Enhancement of the Political and Social Efficacy of the Poor

In theory, rent withholding is unique among code enforcement
tools primarily because it could substantially increase the ability of
tenants to initiate improvements in the units they occupy. Not only
could this enhance the role of individual tenants in their relationships
with landlords, but this capability to initiate change would amount
to a redistribution of power between the poor and the holders of wealth.
The individual's possession of the right to withhold suggests that
individuals may band or be banded together to take action against
landlords throughout a neighborhood. Whereas groups once may have
requested action from public authorities to improve housing conditions,
they now, along with their individual members, may insist upon it.
The legal obligation of the public authority to respond to such demands
provides local organizations with a new leverage which can be exercised
against both public authorities and landlords. If it is indeed true that
increased political power by low-income persons is a necessary prerequisite for improvements in community welfare (a proposition as yet
ill-defined and on some points debatable), then rent withholding
must rank high among potentially useful forms of social policy.
5.

Social Insurance Aspects

Whereas many forms of public control of land use and construction
quality have specifically been geared to the protection of property
values, housing codes have rarely been cast in this role. This is
somewhat odd, if indeed there are substantial externalities generated
by disinvestment in housing and given that in recent years proposals
have been made that support the creation of property owners' insurance
agencies which would protect property from declines in value associated
7
with locational factorsY
It would seem that code-enforcement could serve much the same
function as insurance by protecting property owners against declines
in value associated with disinvestment in nearby units below some
minimal standard. Such enforcement would decrease the risk of holding
97. Marcus & Taussig, A Proposal for Government Insurance of Home Values
Against Locational Risks, 46 LAND ECON. 404 (1970).
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property in neighborhoods that are perceived to be marginal. Of
necessity, such an enforcement program would need to be accompanied
by an investment subsidy to owners or a program whereby the public
sector could assume ownership of properties whose owners could not
afford to maintain them at minimum quality. Nonetheless, the attributes of property value protection associated with zoning may generally
be attributed to code enforcement as well where substantial abandonment is prohibited.
The attempt herein has been to present an overview of the societal
goals which rent withholding might serve. The analysis presented suggests that rent withholding in isolation will prove an ineffective means
of expanding the stock of standard low-income housing. Where this
goal is not served, rent withholding can afford little protection to lowincome consumers except in extreme instances of malfeasance. Likewise, income redistribution would not seem to be an appropriate goal
of rent withholding, unless it were the case that residential property
owners as a group were of the highest income levels of society. Moreover, in the absence of rent controls and forced investment, it would
be difficult to either prevent landlords from shifting costs to the
consumer or to prevent investors from withholding funds from
housing markets.
The goal which rent withholding seems to serve best is that of
providing a mechanism whereby there is an opportunity for lowincome residents to assume greater control of their neighborhoods.
Rent withholding could help to achieve this goal in combination with
growing dissatisfaction tempered with increased social entreprenuership.
Perhaps the least significant of the goals which rent withholding might
serve is that of an insurance mechanism. This is, however, a goal
which in the long-run might become of increased importance, but
which at present cannot be analyzed.
The performance of rent withholding might be significantly improved if it were made the complement of housing subsidy and investment programs.
V.

CONCLUSION

At this stage it is desirable to take the analysis one step further
and view the prospects of rent withholding in terms of: (1) its
present overall impact in light of its varied policy goals; (2) its effectiveness in terms of a broader rehabilitation strategy; and (3) its
importance and impact as a part of a more comprehensive regional and
local housing strategy, meshed with national housing policy and
economic trends.
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On balance, the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act, viewed in
relation to regional and local market operations and housing supply
has only minor importance. While the Act is most probably, as has
been shown, incapable of effectively increasing the supply of low cost
standard housing units and may, in fact, help to slightly decrease
the supply of housing available to the poor, the level of its present use,
as well as the Act's granting to poor individuals certain rights and
powers vis-a-vis landlords, would appear to make its continuation
desirable. Further, since similar provisions in other states," as well
as recent court decisions,99 have increased tenant rights, any decision
to eliminate or restrict rent withholding might unduly effect the climate
of reform in tenant-landlord rights and responsibilities, an area of so
recent reform. In any event, unless more unfavorable economic effects
from the imposition of rent withholding on the operation of housing
markets can be clearly proven by empirical data, one is inclined to
view the Act as an acceptable, if somewhat ineffective, housing
policy tool.
In recent years there has been considerable interest expressed,
primarily by nonprofit and community groups in low income areas,
in more generalized rehabilitation strategies for deteriorating areas.
There have been suggested such concepts as turning large slum properties into community or tenant owned cooperative units and using
profits for rehabilitation, rehabilitation of units by nonprofit development corporations, government guaranteed property values to encourage
investment, and a variety of other "non market" solutions. What role
rent withholding could have in such efforts is debatable. However,
the analysis suggests that low income housing rehabilitation is at
best a questionable strategy and, at worst, may represent an investment
from low income individuals or communities in deteriorating, if not
lost, neighborhoods. Since area rehabilitation is quite difficult even
in middle and upper income areas, it is even more likely to fail in most
low income neigborhoods.' 0 0
Such facts should not necessarily doom housing policy to continual failure. On the contrary, progress is possible even though quite
difficult to achieve. Effective housing policy requires the successful
interrelation of federal, regional, and local efforts as well as a major
98. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (1969) ; N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIONS
§ 755 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney Supp.
1971); N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 143-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
99. Of particular interest and importance to this discussion is Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 383
(1970).
100. For an excellent discussion of the many problems inherent in low cost
LAW
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economic commitment by all sectors of the economy. There is still
much debate among housing experts over the requirements for progress
in housing problems, and while our present effort can not effectively
deal with such complicated issues, some mention of the general components of such a strategy bear mention.
At the foundation of any successful housing strategy must also
be a federal, regional, and local commitment to maintain high levels
of new residential construction. Further, a policy of high rates of
residential construction must effectively deal with both the supply and
demand sides of the housing equation. Programs to increase housing
production must remove any constraints to that production. Local development controls which function artificially to reduce the supply of
available land, or unnecessarily reduce the intensity of its use, must
be eliminated.10 1 Regulations, building codes, and subdivision regulations which unnecessarily raise development costs or housing costs
must be re-examined." 2 Building, labor practices, or methods that
unnecessarily increase housing production costs or retard the development of innovative housing production techniques must be discouraged. 0 3 Increased financial investment in residential real estate by
institutional and individual investors must be encouraged by well
coordinated federal and local policies.10 4 Finally, realistic determination of regional housing needs must be encouraged by federal housing
policies so that the controls exercised by local governments over development may be effectively viewed in terms of the region's general
welfare.10 5
To complement policies designed to increase the supply of housing,
programs capable of increasing the effective demand for housing would
also be necessary. Subsidies to enable moderate income persons to
bargain effectively in the housing market, as well as income supports
for low income families, might significantly increase housing demand.'
101. The importance of land supply to housing production, as well as the effects
of local development controls on the price of raw land, is discussed in A DECENT
HOME, supra note 16, at 135-47 and in BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 16,
at 417-28.
102. Id.
103. This program was recommended by the President's Committee on Urban
Housing to decrease housing costs and boost research and development programs in
the housing field. See A DECENT HOME, supra note 16, at 187-205. For similar

recommendations, see

BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,

supra note 16, at 481-87.

104. For a thorough description of past federal efforts to promote private investments in housing and to coordinate public programs with private market
development, see A DECENT HOME, supra note 16, at 54-91.
105. Two recent plans have attempted to estimate and allocate regional housing
needs to local governments. See METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOV'TS,
FAIR SHARE HOUSING FORMULA
NING COMM'N, A HOUSING PLAN

(1972);

MIAMI VALLEY [OHIO] REGIONAL PLANFOR THE MIAMI VALLEY REGION (1970).

106. The long run effect of increased family incomes on the low income housing
market is a matter of much concern. For an excellent discussion of the important
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Moreover, more generous interest and downpayment requirements
for all housing consumers would greatly increase housing demand.
Additionally, policies, specifically designed and rigorously enforced, to
provide equal opportunity in housing for all citizens regardless of race,
are essential. Without these programs, attempts to deal with the
crisis in nonwhite housing problems are doomed to failure.
High levels of new residential construction, on national, regional,
and local levels, would permit greater flexibility for local governments
to achieve local housing policies. Housing codes and perhaps even
traditional renewal programs could achieve desired results without the
massive dislocations caused in the past. Local policy could deal, particularly in center city areas, with a flexibile market instead of one
virtually in isolation. Within this context, rent withholding could be
a significant tool in improving housing conditions. With an adequate
supply of housing and an open housing market, rent withholding, as a
code enforcement tool, could be successful in forcing compliance with
minimum standards.
Of course, such a strategy is expensive. It is also important.
Without such a comprehensive approach, housing codes and rent withholding, as a code enforcement tool, will likely continue to fail. The
housing market will force the failure, and there is little that public
action can do to reverse the result.
Joseph R. Buckleyt
Gary N. Conleytt
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